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1.  Introduction 
1.1   In 2006, the Treasury reclassified the way in which 
receipts from the EU are handled in the UK government’s 
public expenditure control system. This was intended to be 
a purely technical change, whose impact would be 
budgetarily neutral. We show here that, as regards 
Scotland, this will not be the case. Both the Treasury and 
the Scottish Executive have failed to accommodate the fact 
that receipts from European structural funding in Scotland 
have always been handled in an anomalous fashion. The 
interaction of the reclassification with the way in which EU 
receipts were handled in Scotland, combined with the 
planned reduction in Scotland’s allocation of structural funds 
in the 2007-2013 round, means that Scotland will be 
materially disadvantaged financially in the longer term. 
 
1.2   The primary purpose of this note is to explain in detail 
how this paradoxical situation has come about, and how 
Scotland will be disadvantaged. The secondary purpose, 
however, is to argue that it is now time for the Government 
to provide detailed, verifiable data, on how much additional 
public expenditure cover for structural fund receipts 
Scotland did actually receive in the past. Until this is done, 
the effects identified in this paper cannot be properly 
quantified: and without proper quantification, they cannot be 
rectified. 
 
2.  Background 
2.1 This section of the paper sets out essential background 
on how EU receipts are handled in the UK government’s 
public expenditure control system. Specifically, this section 
covers: 
 
a) the need for public expenditure cover for expenditure 
funded by EU receipts; 
b) how the Scottish Office, (and latterly, the Scottish 
Executive), differed from most other government 
departments in the way it was allocated public 
expenditure cover for expenditure funded by EU 
receipts; 
 
c)  the EC legal requirement for countries to be able to 
demonstrate additionality for expenditure funded by EU 
receipts; 
 
d) the change to the system in the UK for accounting for 
EU receipts introduced by the Treasury in 2006. 
 
What the change at (d) means is that, as from 2006, 
receipts from the EU are counted as negative entries 
against a Department’s expenditure control total, (that is, its 
Departmental Expenditure Limit, or DEL). Unfortunately, 
before the significance of this change can be appreciated, it 
is necessary to go through the other technicalities described 
in this background section. 
 
The need for public expenditure cover for 
expenditure funded by EU receipts: the situation 
prior to 2006 
2.2 This paper is primarily concerned with European 
Structural Funds, which comprise the European Regional 
Development Fund, (ERDF), the European Social Fund, and 
some smaller programmes. Structural funds are allocated by 
the EC to certain programmes, which are in themselves 
often area specific. For example, the Highlands and Islands 
qualified for Objective 1 assistance under the ERDF in 
1994. When EU receipts were spent on a structural fund 
project, then that expenditure also counted as public 
expenditure against the appropriate UK public expenditure 
programme: for example, when ERDF funds were spent on 
an Objective 1 project in the Highlands and Islands, then 
that expenditure counted as expenditure in the public 
expenditure programme of the Secretary of State for 
Scotland, (prior to 1999), or of the Scottish Executive 
thereafter. (Note that ERDF funded expenditure would also 
normally need to attract an equivalent amount of matched 
funding. The question of matched funding raises further 
issues - but we are not primarily concerned with these in this 
paper.) 
 
It is important to note that expenditure funded from 
structural fund receipts counted, (or scored, in public 
expenditure terms), against the Departmental Expenditure 
Limit (DEL) of the responsible department. The DEL is 
effectively that part of a department’s expenditure which is 
cash limited. The department therefore had to have, within 
its DEL, adequate public expenditure cover for anticipated 
structural fund expenditure. 
 
This then raises the question of whether, for a given 
department, the public expenditure cover within its DEL for 
European funded expenditure was additional to what the 
DEL would have been if there had been no EU funding: or 
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whether the required public expenditure cover had been 
carved out, (in whole or in part), from the pre-existing DEL. 
For a conventional Whitehall department, the answer to this 
question is likely to be straightforward: namely, that the 
public expenditure cover within its DEL for EU funding would 
indeed be additional to what the DEL would otherwise have 
been. This is because, for such a department, public 
expenditure planning is done on an incremental basis: with 
the department having the opportunity to bid, at the time of 
the Comprehensive Spending Review, for the extra public 
expenditure resources required to cover an eventuality like 
an increased allocation of structural funds. 
 
Public expenditure cover for structural fund 
expenditure in Scotland 
2.3   The situation in Scotland, however, has been different. 
Changes to the DEL of the Scottish Executive, (and, 
formerly, the Scottish Office), are determined solely by the 
operation of the Barnett formula. Formally, the Scottish 
Assigned Budget, (formerly the Scottish Block), is adjusted 
on a per capita basis for changes in the corresponding 
English programmes. So, prior to 2006, changes to the 
Scottish DEL in relation to the EU structural funds arose, not 
in relation to the amount of EU structural funds allocated to 
Scotland, but in relation to the Barnett consequences of 
structural funds allocated to England. 
 
The fact that the public expenditure cover for structural fund 
expenditure within the responsibility of the Secretary of 
State for Scotland was handled entirely by the normal Block, 
(i.e., Barnett) arrangements, is made clear in the following 
House of Commons exchange: 
 
Mr Swinney:  To ask the Secretary of State for Scotland 
what proportion of the structural funds in each year since 
1974 were (a) allocated for cover to the Scottish Office DEL 
and its previous equivalents through the Scottish Block 
arrangement; and (b) applied using specially negotiated 
agreements….. 
 
Mr Macdonald: Public expenditure provision for all 
European Regional Development Fund or Social Fund 
expenditure for which the Scottish Office was responsible in 
the period since 1974 has been within the Scottish Office 
DEL and its previous equivalents. There have been no 
“specially negotiated agreements” covering the application 
for European Regional Development Fund or European 
Social Fund receipts. 
 
(ref: House of Commons Hansard, (800900), 1998-99). 
 
2.4   In fact, it appears unlikely that the way in which EU 
structural funds impacted on the Scottish DEL would be 
quite as straightforward as implied by the above 
parliamentary exchange. For example, prior to 1992, the 
Scottish programme for industry, energy, trade and 
employment (excluding tourism), was a separate 
programme within the Secretary of State’s responsibility, 
and did not form part of the Block, that is was not subject to 
the Barnett formula: (ref: Scottish Office, 1993). Further, in 
the period during the run-up to the negotiation of the UK 
rebate in 1985, part of the interim rebate arrangements for 
the UK involved the determination of special allocations of 
the rebate for specific regions/countries within the UK. (HM 
Treasury, 1981). How these special allocations interacted 
with the Barnett mechanism is unclear. 
 
2.5   The question then arises of how much public 
expenditure cover was actually added to the Scottish Block 
as a result of European structural fund allocations: and how 
did this relate to the size of European structural fund 
allocations to Scotland? In principle, it is perfectly possible 
that at any given point in time, the sum of the successive 
increments given to Scotland through the operation of the 
Barnett formula on structural fund allocations to England 
could be significantly different from the actual allocation of 
structural funds to Scotland at that time. In fact, given that 
Scotland’s early structural fund allocations were 
proportionately large compared to England’s, it is likely that 
Scotland may well have received only a fraction of its 
structural fund allocation by way of additional public 
expenditure cover in its DEL. 
 
It appears that no figures have ever been published on this 
by the government: nor does the available published 
information allow outsiders to recreate the appropriate 
calculations, particularly in the light of the complicating 
factors identified in the previous paragraph. We do, 
however, come back to this question in section 3, where we 
make some, avowedly crude, estimates based on published 
information. 
 
2.6   The European Committee of the Scottish Parliament 
carried out an inquiry into European Structural Funds and 
their implementation in Scotland in 2000. Among the 
questions they considered was how much additional public 
expenditure cover had actually been allocated to the 
Scottish DEL in respect of Structural Funds: (European 
Committee, 2000). One of the major sources of evidence 
the Committee examined on this topic was a paper by Bell 
and Christie (2000). This paper discussed the implications 
of the Barnett formula and its interaction with ERDF funding: 
in it, Bell and Christie state that: 
 
“ If the change that Scotland receives in its ERDF 
allocation from the EU is greater than that received by 
England, then there will be a shortfall in funding. 
However, if ERDF provision in Scotland is growing 
more slowly than it is in England (which certainly 
occurred during the 1994-95 programming period), 
then there will be no shortfall.” 
 
This statement, however, could mislead. While the 
mechanism Bell and Christie describe refers to changes in 
allocations and public expenditure provision, their 
conclusion “there will be no shortfall” is drafted in such a 
way that it could be interpreted as referring to absolute 
levels. It is true to say that, if ERDF provision in Scotland is 
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growing more slowly than that in England, then the change 
in public expenditure provision in the Scottish DEL resulting 
from the Barnett consequence of the change in the English 
allocation will exceed the change in the Scottish allocation
1
. 
However, if the Scottish public expenditure provision were 
starting from a position of shortfall relative to the Scottish 
structural fund allocation, then the greater increase in the 
period in question might be very far from wiping out the 
entire deficit, and Scotland might well end the period still 
suffering from an absolute deficit in public expenditure 
provision. 
 
2.7   In the light of this, the Committee’s conclusion as to 
whether there was indeed adequate additional public 
expenditure cover appears unduly reassuring. Consider the 
following:- “The Committee considers that, over the 2000-06 
period, it is unlikely that Scotland is losing out in the 
allocation for Structural Funds in the Assigned Budget given 
that Structural Fund expenditure in Scotland is planned to 
increase (compared to the 1994-99 period) at a slower rate 
than in England, and the Barnett formula is likely to deliver 
to Scotland more resources. Indeed, the Committee has 
been assured that the Assigned Budget contains a surplus 
in provision for Structural Funds over the next seven years.” 
(European Committee, 2000). The first sentence in this 
quotation clearly relies heavily on the Bell and Christie 
paper, and is therefore subject to the criticism outlined in the 
previous paragraph. The last sentence in this quotation is 
irrelevant, since the real issue is not how much provision 
has been earmarked for structural funds cover within the 
Assigned Budget, but how much of this represents 
genuinely additional provision. 
 
2.8   The clarity of public debate on this issue in Scotland 
has not been helped by some confusing statements by the 
Executive. For example, the following statement was made 
by Jack McConnell when he was Finance Minister. 
“Structural funds are additional to other expenditure in the 
Scottish Ministers’ Assigned Budget, but they are also an 
integral part of it.” (ref: Evidence to European Committee of 
Scottish Parliament, 30
th 
May 2000). 
 
 
 
2.9   The fact that Scotland could well have received only a 
fraction of its structural fund allocation by way of additional 
public expenditure cover in its DEL has excited relatively 
little public interest in Scotland. This contrasts with the 
position in Wales. When much of Wales achieved Objective 
1 status in 2000, it rapidly became clear to the Welsh 
Assembly and public that little or no financial advantage to 
Wales would result, and there would also be considerable 
internal dislocation of spending programmes, due to the 
need to accommodate public expenditure cover and 
matched funding within a virtually unchanged DEL. After 
mounting a vigorous campaign the Welsh successfully 
obtained an exception to Barnett, which gave them an 
additional £272m in their DEL, to at least partially alleviate 
the identified problems: (ref: European Committee, 2000). 
Additionality 
2.10   It is also appropriate to consider the legal requirement 
on structural fund recipients to demonstrate additionality. 
There is a discussion of this issue in the Scotland Office 
minute of evidence to the House of Commons Scottish 
Affairs Committee in 1999. The basic requirement, set out in 
Article 11 of Regulation 1260/99 is that: 
 
“In order to achieve a genuine economic impact, the 
appropriations of the funds may not replace public or 
equivalent structural expenditure by the Member 
States.” 
 
Rules on the implementation of the additionality requirement 
had been set out in the Kerr-Millan agreement of 1992, and 
have been refined subsequently. Basically, additionality has 
to be demonstrated at the level of the relevant Objective 1, 
(or if appropriate, Objective 2 and 3) area. The important 
point, from a Scotland point of view, is that there is no 
requirement to demonstrate additionality at the levels of 
regions/countries within Member States: (Scotland Office, 
1999). 
 
2.10   The European Committee of the Scottish Parliament 
expressed their dissatisfaction with this state of affairs, as 
follows: 
 
“However, the Committee believes that, in the ‘spirit 
of additionality’, it should be possible to demonstrate 
the degree to which Structural Funds are additional to 
domestic spending in Scotland. Although the Funds 
are certainly additional for individual project 
applicants, at the Scotland level the published figures 
are inadequate for determining the net impact of EU 
funding on overall Departmental and programme 
economic development spending. 
 
Although requests were made to UK Government 
Ministers to attend the Committee’s Inquiry meetings, 
they declined. The Committee feels that the 
subsequent written information provided was not 
sufficient to verify the net impact of EU funding on 
economic development spending in Scotland. This is 
a matter of regret.” 
 
(European Committee, 2000) 
 
The change in the treatment of European funding 
in 2006 
2.11   With effect from 2006-07, the Treasury has 
reclassified receipts from the European Union as negative 
DEL: (Scottish Executive, 2006). The result of this 
reclassification is that the budget for structural fund 
expenditure is now reported net of expected EC receipts. As 
the structural fund programme is fully funded by the EC, this 
means that payments out of the budget on structural fund 
projects are exactly balanced by payments in from the EC - 
so net expenditure on the structural fund budget is now 
zero. With effect from the 2006-07 planning round, 
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therefore, the Scottish Executive DEL has been reduced to 
allow for this change. 
 
 
What this change means, effectively, is that expenditure on 
structural fund funded projects is now regarded as 
constituting direct payments from the EU to the final 
recipient: it now by-passes the UK public expenditure 
control system. There is therefore no longer any need for 
public expenditure cover for European structural fund 
payments within the DEL, and DELs have been reduced by 
the amount of European structural fund cover that they 
previously contained. 
 
2.12   This change is intended to be budgetarily neutral: and 
indeed it is neutral in the specific sense that structural fund 
projects will continue to be funded on exactly the scale that 
was previously planned: and the change has had no effect 
on the amount of residual, (that is, non-structural fund 
cover), provision in departments’ DELs: so there has been 
no incentive on departments to either increase or decrease 
their non-structural fund expenditure. 
 
 
3.  Why the change in classification of structural 
fund receipts is not neutral in respect of Scotland 
3.1   While the Treasury change in the handling of European 
structural fund receipts is neutral in the specific sense 
described in paragraph 2.12, the change is not neutral in the 
longer term for Scotland. Why this is so can most easily be 
illustrated by the following schematic illustration. 
 
3.2   Consider two countries within the UK, denoted by A 
and B, whose initial DELs are assumed to be, respectively, 
£1000 million and £100 million per annum. In year 3, both 
countries are assumed to benefit from an allocation of 
structural funds: A receives £200m per annum: while B, 
(reflecting greater need), receives proportionately more, at 
£40m per annum. Both structural fund programmes last for 
6 years, when both programmes terminate. 
 
The ways in which the DEL provisions for A and B are 
calculated differ, however. For A, additional DEL cover for 
the full structural fund  allocation of £200m is provided in 
year 3, and lasts for the 6 year length of the structural fund 
programme. However, the adjustment to the DEL of B is 
done by a Barnett type relationship, under which B receives 
an adjustment to its DEL of 10% of the change in A’s DEL. 
Finally, we complete this hypothetical picture by assuming 
that in year 6 the new Treasury method for accounting for 
EU receipts in DEL is introduced. 
 
The following tables then illustrate what happens. 
 
Here, we use the term “gross spending power” to describe 
the maximum amount of actual expenditure which can take 
place, funded from DEL or European receipts. Up until the 
end of year 5, this is limited by the size of the DEL, since 
under the old system, structural fund expenditure has to 
have cover within the DEL. From year 6 onwards, gross 
spending power represents the sum of DEL plus the 
structural fund allocation. 
 
 
Table 1: The situation in A 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Years 
A: structural fund 
allocation (£m) 
 
A: Del (£m) 
Gross 
spending 
power (£m) 
 
1 
 
- 
 
1000 
 
1000 
2 - 1000 1000 
3 200 1200 1200 
4 200 1200 1200 
5 200 1200 1200 
6 200 1000 1200 
7 200 1000 1200 
8 200 1000 1200 
9 - 1000 1000 
10 - 1000 1000 
 
 
 
 
The situation described in Table 1 is entirely straightforward: 
in year 3, A’s DEL is adjusted upwards by the full amount of 
the European structural fund allocation: given the change in 
accounting for EU receipts in year 6, A’s DEL in that year is 
adjusted down by the full European structural fund allocation 
- but since structural fund receipts no longer count against 
DEL, gross spending power remains unchanged, fulfilling 
the neutrality criterion. When the European structural fund 
programme terminates in year 9, gross spending power 
reverts to £1,000 million, the same level as A’s original DEL. 
 
 
 
3.3   Now consider the corresponding position for B as 
shown in Table 2. 
 
Here, changes to the DEL of country B are determined by 
the Barnett type arrangement. With the increase in DEL 
provision in A by £200 million in year 3, B’s DEL rises by 
£20 million: so to find the required public expenditure cover 
within its DEL for its structural fund allocation of £40m, B will 
have to squeeze existing programmes within its DEL by 
£20m. In year 6, with the change in accounting for EU 
receipts, B’s DEL is reduced by the full amount of its 
structural fund allocation, that is, by £40m. The effect is 
indeed neutral in the short term and gross spending power 
is maintained at £120m. But when the structural fund 
programme terminates in year 9, B is left with its DEL at 
£80m, instead of with its original DEL of £100m. 
 
Note that this is purely an effect of the change in the 
Treasury treatment of EU receipts: if the old treatment of EU 
receipts had been maintained throughout, then in year 9 
country B would have received the negative Barnett 
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consequential of the reduction in country A’s DEL in that 
year: and B’s DEL would then have reverted to its original 
value of £100m. 
 
 
Table 2: The situation in B 
 
Years B: Structural fund 
allocation (£m) 
 
b: DEL (£m) 
Gross spending 
power (£m) 
 
1 
 
- 
 
100 
 
100 
2 - 100 100 
3 40 120 120 
4 40 120 120 
5 40 120 120 
6 40 80 120 
7 40 80 120 
8 40 80 120 
9 - 80 80 
10 - 80 80 
 
 
 
 
Overall, despite its total structural fund allocation of £240 
million, B achieved an increase in gross spending power, 
over the 6 years when it was in receipt of structural funding, 
of only £120 million in total. Further, to achieve this, the total 
displacement of existing spending within B’s DEL over the 
period was no less than £360 million, (comprising £240 
million for matched funding, and £120 million for public 
expenditure  cover). This would have been the situation 
anyway, whether or not the change in accounting practice 
had been made in year 6. The sting in the tail, however, is 
that, because of the change in accounting practice, B will 
suffer a permanent reduction in gross spending power of 
£20 million, in every year from year 9 on- in perpetuity. 
Country B might well ask itself, in these circumstances, 
whether it was actually worthwhile receiving any structural 
fund allocation in the first place. 
 
 
3.4   The conclusion to be drawn from this schematic 
example is that the Treasury change in accounting practice 
is not neutral in the longer term for a country whose DEL is 
determined by a Barnett type formula.  In the particular 
example given, country B has been permanently 
disadvantaged in the longer term, purely because of the 
Treasury change. This arises because, in the circumstances 
of country B, the Treasury change has in fact altered the 
rule which determines how gross spending power changes. 
Under the old system, gross spending power is determined 
by the size of DEL, which is in turn determined by Barnett: 
under the new system, changes in the European structural 
fund related component of gross spending power are 
determined by changes in country B’s own European 
structural fund allocation. The fact that, at the time of the 
change, there is no step change in gross spending power 
does not get round the difficulty that, once European 
structural fund allocations start to change thereafter, gross 
spending power will then be on a different, and non-neutral, 
path. 
 
3.5   The above example is purely illustrative: but it is not 
totally unrealistic as regards the position of Scotland. As the 
example illustrates, a country whose DEL is governed by a 
Barnett type mechanism loses out as a result of the 
Treasury change if the following combination of 
circumstances holds: 
 
 
a)   the country initially has a relatively large European 
structural fund  allocation; 
 
b)   the old system of accounting for structural fund receipts 
is in use when structural fund allocations are 
Introduced; 
 
c)   the change to the new system is made before a 
significant reduction in structural fund allocations. 
 
But this is very much the situation Scotland finds itself in. 
The old system of accounting for structural fund receipts 
was used from the introduction of the structural fund until 
2006 - which is just before Scotland’s structural fund 
allocations are due to be significantly reduced. In the very 
same publication which recorded the Treasury’s change of 
accounting treatment for EU receipts as from 2006-07, it is 
also recorded that EU funding of the 2007-13 structural fund 
programme for Scotland is likely to be only 45% of the 
funding secured for the 2000-06 programme: (ref: Scottish 
Executive, 2006). To put these figures in perspective, 
Scotland’s allocation of structural funds over the period 
2000-06 was £1,094 million: (ref: European Committee, 
2000). 
 
3.6   This brings us back to the question which we have 
already posed in paragraph 2.5: how much additional public 
expenditure cover was actually added to the Scottish Block 
by means of the Barnett formula as a result of past 
structural fund allocations to England: and how did this 
relate to the size of Scotland’s actual structural fund 
allocations. This is the critical question to which an answer 
is required before a definitive assessment can be made of 
whether and by how much Scotland will be disadvantaged in 
the long term by the accounting change for structural fund 
receipts. 
 
While, as we have seen, it is not possible to answer this 
question accurately from published information, it is possible 
to form a rough estimate based on published sources, 
provided we take at face value the answer given by the 
Scottish Secretary of State to the Parliamentary question 
recorded at paragraph 2.3 above. 
 
3.7   The two sources of information we use are: 
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a)   population figures for Scotland and England, published 
in the Annual Abstract of Statistics: (ONS, 2006); 
 
b)  estimates published in successive volumes of Regional 
Trends, which show structural fund allocations to the four 
countries of the UK: (ONS, various dates). 
 
Table 3: Key ratios 
 
 
 
 
Year 
Population ratio 
S/E (2) 
SF allocation 
ratio S/E (3) 
Ratio of line (2) 
to line (3) 
 
95/96 
 
0.1055 
 
02861 
 
0.37 
96/97 0.1049 0.2853 0.37 
97/98 0.1044 0.2693 0.39 
98/99 01.04 0.2677 0.39 
99/00 0.1034 0.2696 0.38 
00/01 0.1028 0.1845 0.56 
01/02 0.1024 0.1805 0.57 
02/03 0.1018 0.1745 0.58 
03/04 0.1014 0.1688 0.60 
04/05 0.1014 0.1489 0.68 
05/06 0.101 0.1489 0.68 
 
 
The final row in this table is an estimate of the ratio of the amount of 
additional public expenditure cover which the Scottish Block had 
attracted because of the operation of the structural funds to the 
actual allocation of structural funds to Scotland: see text. 
 
 
 
Based on these two sources, the Scotland to England ratios 
of population, and also of structural fund allocations, can be 
derived for the years 1995-96 to 2005-06. The relevant 
ratios are shown in the first two rows of Table 3. We can see 
from row 1 that Scotland’s population is roughly 10% of that 
of England, and declining in relative terms. From the second 
row we can see that the amount of structural funding 
allocated to Scotland was 28.61% of that allocated to 
England in 1995-96, dropping to 14.89% in 2005-06: 
Scotland has therefore been allocated proportionately more 
than its population share throughout the period for which we 
have data, but to a decreasing extent. 
 
As noted earlier, changes to the Scottish DEL are 
determined by the Barnett formula. If Barnett is applied to 
the spending allocation for a newly introduced policy in each 
year from the inception of that policy, then, each year, the 
change to Scotland’s DEL is Scotland’s population share of 
the change to the English DEL. This would imply that at any 
point in time, the total provision allocated to Scotland’s DEL 
because of that policy will approximately equal Scotland’s 
population share of the provision for that policy in the 
English DEL. So for example, in 1995-96, the public 
expenditure provision allocated to Scotland’s DEL because 
of structural funds would be Scotland’s population share, 
that is, 0.1055 of the structural fund provision in England’s 
DEL. However, from Regional Trends, the structural fund 
allocation to Scotland, relative to England in 1995-96 was 
0.2861. So the proportion Scotland actually received in 
additional public expenditure cover, relative to the size of 
Scotland’s structural fund allocation, was 0.1055/0.28, which 
equals 0.37. That is, additional public expenditure cover 
represented 37% of Scotland’s structural fund allocation. 
 
3.8   The figures in the third row of Table 3 imply that, in the 
early 1990s, Scotland was paying for 63% of its structural 
fund support on its own, by diverting resources from 
elsewhere within its DEL. (In fact, given that Scotland also 
had to provide matched funding for structural fund 
programmes out of its DEL, the actual diversion of funds in 
the DEL to meet structural fund commitments would have 
been 1.63 times the actual structural fund allocation). 
 
By the end of the period, the figures in Table 3 imply that the 
situation had improved somewhat, with the amount of 
additional public expenditure cover which the Scottish Block 
had attracted because of the operation of the structural 
funds representing just over two thirds of the actual 
allocation of structural funds to Scotland: hence, at that 
time, Scotland was paying for 32% of its structural fund 
support by diverting resources from elsewhere within its 
DEL. 
 
In terms of money amounts, the estimates in Table 3, taken 
together with Scotland’s planned structural fund allocations, 
imply that the shortfall in the Scottish DEL as regards public 
expenditure cover for structural fund allocations would have 
amounted to some £810 million in total, over the years 
1995-96 to 2005-06. 
 
3.9   Note however, that the figures in row 3 of Table 3 can 
at best be fairly imprecise estimates of  the amount of 
additional public expenditure cover in Scotland’s DEL 
relative to the size of Scotland’s structural fund allocation. 
This is because, for the reasons noted in paragraph 2.5, it is 
difficult to believe that the Barnett formula or an equivalent 
was actually applied in a pure form throughout the period 
since the structural fund was started. There is a need for the 
government to produce better estimates, based on auditable 
data. Until this happens, the Table 3 figures represent the 
best estimates available. 
 
3.10   The implications of the estimates in Table 3 are 
serious, when considered in conjunction with the effects of 
the Treasury change in accounting practice for EU receipts. 
Table 3 implies that Scotland’s structural fund programme 
was only funded to the extent of 68% by way of genuinely 
additional cover in its DEL immediately before the change in 
accounting practice in 2006. Further, in the six years after 
the change in accounting practice, there is projected to be a 
55% drop in structural fund allocations to Scotland: (ref: 
Scottish Executive, 2006). As we have shown above in the 
schematic example, after the change in accounting practice 
the changes in gross spending power are determined 
directly by changes in Scotland’s structural fund allocation. 
Hence, by 2013, Scotland will only benefit from the 
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structural funds to the extent of (68%-55%), that is just over 
10% of its current structural fund allocation. 
 
This means that, in 2013 structural funds will channel only a 
marginal amount of net additional resources to Scotland. 
Any significant further falls in structural fund allocations 
thereafter would actually push Scotland into the negative - 
so that Scotland would be in the ridiculous position of 
permanently receiving less funding than if the structural fund 
programme had never been invented. Moreover, even in 
2013, although Scotland receives only marginal net funding 
benefit, structural funds will distort the Scottish budget, both 
because additionality has to be shown at local level for the 
areas within Scotland that are covered by structural fund 
and because the Scottish DEL has to provide matched 
funding. 
 
3.11   The conclusion in the preceding paragraph can be 
expressed in another way. In 2006-07, the Scottish 
structural fund  allocation budgeted for in the Scottish 
budget was £170 million. According to the estimates in 
Table 3 above, this would probably have been funded to the 
extent of 68% by genuinely additional public expenditure 
cover: meaning that 32%, or £54 million, would be funded 
by displacement from within the DEL. The effect of the 
Treasury change is that this £54 million disadvantage then 
becomes permanently locked in. If Scotland’s structural fund 
allocation were eventually reduced to zero, then at that time, 
(and ever after), Scotland’s DEL would be £54 million per 
annum less than it otherwise would have been. Viewed 
against a total Scottish DEL of over £25 billion, this effect 
may not seem large: but the effect is permanent, and it is of 
a material size. 
 
3.12   As has been noted above, the question of the 
additionality or otherwise of EU structural funding in 
Scotland has, in the past, attracted relatively little public 
attention and debate. The reasons for this are unclear: but 
one contributory factor must have been the obscure, and in 
some cases, confusing nature of many government 
statements on this issue. But in addition, there has also 
been an element of “swings and roundabouts” in the attitude 
taken by some commentators: in other words, that what 
Scotland lost on the swings through the Barnett mechanism, 
as our structural fund allocations rose relative to England’s, 
we might in due course regain on the roundabouts as our 
allocations started to decline in relative terms. Such a view, 
for example, could be read into the following comment by 
Professor Heald, in speculating why non-additionality was a 
less contentious topic in Scotland than in Wales:- “Scotland 
faces a period of the withdrawal of EU funding, with the 
corollary of ‘non-additionality of increases’ being ‘non- 
deductibility of decreases’.” (Heald, 2000) 
 
Now that the Treasury accounting change has broken the 
swings and roundabouts link, and we start to lose on the 
roundabouts what we never gained on the swings, it is to be 
hoped that the whole issue of EU funding in Scotland, both 
past and present, will be given a thorough public airing. 
4.  Conclusion 
4.1   We draw the following conclusions from the above: 
 
1)  The recent Treasury change in the handling of EU 
structural fund receipts is not neutral in the long term 
for a country like Scotland, if future significant changes 
in European structural fund allocations are in prospect, 
as they are; 
 
2) Our estimates, based on the available published 
figures, suggest that possibly only 68% of Scotland’s 
structural fund allocation was backed by genuinely 
additional public expenditure cover within the DEL 
when the Treasury changed accounting procedures in 
2006. Taken together with the projected 55% drop in 
structural fund allocation to Scotland by 2013, this 
implies that in 2013, Scotland will experience only a 
marginal net funding benefit from the structural fund 
programme. Any further significant reduction in 
structural fund allocations thereafter will mean that 
Scotland will be permanently worse off as a result of 
the existence of the structural fund programme than it 
would have been if the structural fund programme had 
never existed. In addition it will have had its public 
expenditure programme distorted in order to provide 
matched funding; 
 
3) Our estimates are inevitably imprecise, given the 
limitations of the published information available. The 
critical factor in determining exactly what the long term 
effect of the accounting changes will be on Scotland is 
to know how much of Scotland’s structural fund 
allocation was actually backed by genuinely additional 
public expenditure cover within the Scottish DEL, at the 
time when the change in accounting practice took 
place: (in other words, how much smaller would the 
Scottish DEL have been at that point, if there never had 
been a European structural fund programme). The 
published figures do not enable this critical quantity to 
be estimated with accuracy. It is of vital importance that 
the government makes this information publicly 
available, providing credible, and verifiable, estimates 
of the key quantity: namely, the amount of genuinely 
additional public expenditure cover for structural funds 
within the Scottish DEL at the time of the accounting 
change. 
 
4.2   Our primary concern in this paper is with the future 
implications of the recent accounting change for EU 
receipts. However, publication of the detailed historical data 
which, we argue, is now required, would provide the 
additional bonus of settling, once and for all, the vexed 
question of how much additional public expenditure cover 
Scotland did actually receive in the past in respect of 
European structural funds, relative to Scotland’s structural 
fund allocations. 
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